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Resumo 
A utilização de recursos informáticos é a estratégia mais comum à maioria das organizações 
para gerirem os seus ativos e propriedade intelectual. Esta decisão estratégica implica a sua 
exposição ao exterior através de canais de comunicação (infraestrutura de dados). 
 
McDermott e Redish (1999), descrevem a terceira lei de Newton como o princípio da ação - 
reação, as organizações ao exporem a sua infraestrutura ao exterior despoletaram, como reação, 
estranhos quererem aceder à sua infraestrutura para diversos fins, seja como puro divertimento, 
detetarem fragilidades ou, mais relevante para este trabalho, roubarem ativos/propriedade 
intelectual e criarem uma disrupção no serviços. 
 
As organizações sentem necessidade de se protegerem contra estes estranhos/ataques ao 
implementarem estratégias de segurança, mas a realidade é que as linhas de defesa da rede são 
permeáveis e as arquiteturas de segurança não são suficientemente dinâmicas para travar as 
ameaças existentes. 
 
Uma estratégia de segurança informática baseada na tecnologia “Deception” poderá permitir 
de uma forma rápida detetar, analisar e defender as redes organizacionais contra-ataques em tempo 
real. Esta tecnologia “Deception” poderá oferecer informações precisas sobre “malware” e 
atividades maliciosas não detetadas por outros tipos de defesa cibernética. 
 
Este trabalho pretende explorar esta estratégia recente baseada em “Deception”, que pretende 
ser diferenciadora face à panóplia de dispositivos/software de segurança informática existentes. 
 
Como resultados, pretende-se elaborar uma análise onde as organizações possam perceber a 
tecnologia “Deception” nas suas vertentes da eficácia, eficiência e o seu valor estratégico para 
que, eventualmente, a possam utilizar para suportar/adicionar valor a uma decisão de estratégia 
de segurança informática. 
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Abstract 
The use of Information Technology (IT) resources are the common approach for most 
organizations so they assets and intellectual property are properly managed. This strategic 
decision implies its exposure to the outside world through the data infrastructure. 
 
McDermott and Redish (1999), described the third Newton’s law as the principle of action- 
reaction, when organizations expose their infrastructure to the outside world and, as a response, 
strangers want to access their infrastructure for various purposes, either as pure fun, detect 
weaknesses or, more relevant for this work, steal assets/intellectual property. 
 
Organizations feel the need to protect themselves against these strangers/attacks by 
implementing security strategies, but truly, the network's first defense lines are permeable, and 
the security architectures are not dynamic enough to face existing or future threats. 
 
A Deception-based technology could enable the organizations to quickly detect, analyze and 
defend organizational networks against real-time attacks. Deception technology may provide 
accurate information on malware and malicious activity not detected by other types of cyber 
defense. 
 
This work intends to explore a new technology, Deception, that claims a differentiation when 
compared with the range of existing information security suite. The types of cyber-threats and 
their materialization could be relevant to the information technology and risk analysis. 
 
Thus, the intent is to elaborate an analysis where organizations can understand the Deception 
technology, his effectiveness, and strategic value so they can, eventually, use it to support/add value 
to a decision regarding information security strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Dinicu (2014) stated that the cyber-attack is the “Achilles heel” of the modern state security, 
highly technologized and well developed, whose biggest problem is, in this matter, the proper and 
precise identification of the source, and the problem becomes more complicated as the attack is 
becoming more sophisticated.”  
 
 
Figure 1. Common Cyber Attacks (Source GOV.UK) 
 
Kopp (2000) states that Information Warfare is particularly impacting the world order in the 
sense that intellectual/military property is being used to target nations and organizations in such 
a way that business advantage and military dominance are just two clicks away from being 
destroyed.  
 
The cyber-crime trend is increasing in the sense that more and more attacks are occurring. 
Additionally, the cyber-threats are increasing, the number of “zero-day” vulnerabilities reported 
exposes how vulnerable the network perimeter is even with an aggressive patching policy. 
   
All the available information lead to the assumption that the organization's first line of 
defense is not performing as expected, allowing the attackers continuous access to assets and 
intellectual property impacting the organizations at a brand and financial levels. 
 
1.2 Problem 
The cyberspace attackers techniques are dynamic as they are supported by a large community 
of experts and by continuous research that not bound to formal software development so can be 
used very quickly, the information security architectures are not. The lead time between an attack 
and the detection of that attack, by the organization's security teams, are immense, if ever. The 
disruption provoked by the cyber-incidents affects everyone from financial organizations to life 
support devices. 
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1.3 Objective 
Identify the Deception Technology (DCT) main features and the applicability to the problem 
statement. Identify an organization to test the concept and derive the results. Add testimonial,  
Use Case and Proof of Concept to strength the arguments.  
1.4 Proposed Solution 
Deception technology was considered as a proposed solution by questioning the status quo 
regarding the information security suite of tools that are not performing as expected.  Based on 
the number of cyber-incidents, and change the paradigm from protecting the network and stop an 
attacker from penetrating the environment too, also, assume that all the attacks cannot be stopped, 
and an intrusion will occur eventually.  
 
A Deception technology based solution that reduces the intrusion detection time performs 
better than a human-based solution and exposes quality information to prevent future attacks. 
 
Deception technology pairs with the information security suite of tools adding a layer of 
protection reveal the attacker when they are already inside the network. 
 
 
Figure 2. Deception Value (Source RSA Security Conference 2017) 
1.5 Document Structure 
This work is a structure of seven(7) chapters. First, the Introduction, where the motivation 
to write this work is highlighted, followed by the problem statement and solution proposal, 
finished by the projected goals. 
 
The next chapter is the Literature Overview; the domain is put into a context to induce the 
correct mindset for this work. The relevant, for this work, knowledge areas are also referred to 
understand the top IS technologies, actors, threats and the Deception technology. 
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On the Methodology chapter, the method is referred along with the theoretical map, 
assumptions and the path to reach the goals. 
 
After the Methodology chapter, the Results chapter describe what was achieved by 
describing the artifacts and expectations. 
 
The Conclusions and Future Work chapter describe the insights and wrap up this work, 
ended by a projection on what could be logical next investigation steps. 
 
The references list can be found in the Bibliography chapter;  
 
Inside the Appendix chapter holds mainly the SPMS supporting documents and some tables 
used but more readable. 
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2. Literature Overview 
2.1 Research Methodology 
2.1.1 Building on Prior Research 
The body of the investigation, both within the Information Security and Network Security 
literature and in the neighborhood disciplines, did not provide the traditional support for this 
work. The technological component Deception, part of the proposed solution, is a recent 
evolution of a more old concept, Honeypot, but only at a conceptual level. The intention is to 
adopt a research strategy that will address the objectives but also the challenges of this work, so 
an analysis touching research methodologies are mandatory to leverage any relevant for this 
work methods, techniques.  
2.1.2 Methodology Landscape 
The scientific method is based, in part, on the ability to replicate a particular research.  
Specifically, in order to fully replicate a research, other researchers must know the Who, What, 
Where, When, and How. In short, a methodology provides a blueprint for conducting research 
based on other using the same framework of procedures and techniques by setting a shared 
understanding across the community. By reaching this baseline, researchers can infer the results 
using a common background. 
 
A methodologic approach is defined by a logical and systematic mindset that focuses on  the 
content, mainly on the techniques and methods used.  
 
Research is scientific when it employs the scientific method. The key to the scientific 
method is replicability. A method is scientific to the extent that procedures are described 
objectively and in detail so that another investigator may repeat and independently verify 
results. A method to be scientific must be valid and reliable. Validity is the degree to which 
scientific observations actually measure or record what they purport to measure, and reliability 
is the repeatability, including interpersonal replicability of scientific observations, (Reswick, 
1994). 
2.1.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Methodologies 
Pickard (2007) echoes a fairly basic standpoint that there are only two  basic methodologies: 
quantitative and qualitative. The choice between these two is the highest level methodological 
decision. The metatheoretical assumptions discussed in the previous chapter have a strong 
influence on this methodological choice.  
2.1.3.1 Quantitative vs. qualitative 
It is true that quantitative research is usually associated with the physical and biomedical 
sciences while qualitative research is found mostly in the social sciences. But neither is 
exclusive of the other. In fact, a great deal of social science research is highly quantitative 
involving, as it does, advanced statistical methods (Reswick, 1994). 
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Quantitative and qualitative research differ in at least three major ways: 
1. The processes are different  
2. The tools are different 
3. The outcomes differ 
 
Characteristic Quantitative Qualitative 
Metatheory Positivist, Postpositivist Interpretive 
Nature of reality Singular, stable, independent of 
observer; external reality 
Multifarious, culturally determined, socially 
constructed; holistic reality, 
Relation of investigator to 
what is studied 
External, observing from outside; in 
artificial setting 
In the study setting, observing from within; in 
real-life setting 
Relation to social 
phenomenon 
Neutral Empirical Engaged Normative 
Research aim Nomothetic; hypothesis testing; 
generalizing 
Idiographic; hypothesis generating; 
contextualizing 
Strategies Structured, theory-derived variables 
identified beforehand; controls; 
operationalization & measurement 
Unstructured, open-ended, theory developed 
during research; concepts that are rich in meaning 
Typical methods Experiments, surveys Participant observation, case studies 
Criteria for judging 
research 
Validity & Reliability; objectivity Credibility, transferability, dependability; 
authenticity 
Table 1. Quantitative Research vs. Qualitative Research (Reswick, 1994) 
 
As shown in Table 1, the quantitative research process is linear and unidirectional. In 
automatic control theory, it would be termed "open loop." The quantitative researcher is able to 
isolate the experimental or study system, define the parameters, and select and measure relevant 
variables with precision and accuracy; The thinking process is essentially deductive following a 
creative act of hypothesis formulation, (Reswick, 1994). 
 
As shown in Table 1, the inductive character of qualitative research and its interactive or 
closed-loop feedback nature. The qualitative researcher cannot define the system and its 
variables with the relevancy and accuracy of the quantitative researcher. Therefore, creates an 
original theory (based perhaps on intuition and experience), and proceeds to organize the study, 
apply tools, and gather data. As data accumulate and are reduced, the researcher may well 
redefine the model and alter the study design employing a refining method called comparative 
analysis, (Reswick, 1994). 
 
The quantitative researcher may work in the laboratory with instruments that measure 
quantities with precision and accuracy. Statistical methods provide tools to measure reliability 
and validity of results. 
 
The qualitative researcher is likely to include questionnaires, focus groups, interviews, and 
personal participation and observation. 
 
The outcome of quantitative research is usually a true test of an a priori stated hypothesis. 
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The results of qualitative research is a grounded theory. The process starts with a theory 
based on experience and intuition. It ends with a theory that is grounded in data. If the data are 
reliable and valid and the study can be replicated by others, then the theory is credible, and the 
process is scientific  (Reswick, 1994). 
2.1.4 Main Research Methodologies under Analysis 
The approach for the analysis is a tabular format for each of the methodologies for a more 
easy identification of the key aspects, the naming, characterization with reference authors and 
applicability will be part of the analysis. 
 
Here, the Behavioral science methodology was not considered due to his focus on 
psychology, social neuroscience, and cognitive aspects, not aligned with the scope of this work. 
 
A final table with the key dimensions of each methodology will drive the approach for this 
work, either a pure or a mixed approach as defended by (Nabukenya 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Research Methodologies under Analysis 
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2.1.4.1  Design Science (DS) 
 
 
Table 2. Design Science (DS) Summary 
 
The DS process clearly defines the path, from the identification of the situation, the 
definition of the problem. Ahead, the loop until the present state is defined, retro-feed the 
problem definition moving to a preferred system design, with inputs from the inventory 
alternatives and evaluation criteria. After developing the implementation strategies, the process 
is documented, the artifacts developed, and the plan is communication. Finally, a larger planning 
process is initiated. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Design Science Planning Process (Simon, 1996) 
 
  
Research Method Characterization Applicability
Systematic way of designing or designing things
(Fuller and McHale 1965)
Create knowledge about the design process, general or specific, 
particularly relevant to design tasks, and aims to develop artefacts 
that originate satisfactory solutions for practical problems
(Gregory 1966)
Use of artifacts that are "artificial objects that can be characterized 
in terms of goals, functions and adaptations. They are usually 
discussed, particularly during the concession, both in imperative 
terms and descriptives... "thereby giving"... fulfillment of a purpose, 
or adaptation to a goal. Involves a relationship of three elements: 
the purpose or purpose, the character of the artifact and the 
environment in which it works... "IE"... an artifact can be regarded 
as a meeting point-interface-between an internal environment, the 
substance and organisation of the artifact itself, and an external 
environment, this is the conditions under which the artifact works... 
(Simon 1996)
Summary Table of Research Methods: Characterization and Applicability
Design Science (DS)
Predominance in the area of 
information systems because 
is an agregator of people, 
organisations and technology
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2.1.4.2 Design Science Research (DSR) 
 
 
Table 3. Design Science Research (DSR) Summary 
 
The DSR cycle uses the domains Environment and Knowledge Base as inputs, in a loop 
where the organizations and scientific knowledge come together to produce artifacts and 
processes.  
 
 
Figure 5. Design Science Research Cycle (Hevner et al. 2004) 
 
Research Method Characterization Applicability
Evolution of activities through the DSR methodology, in the 
construction phase and after defining the problem, leads us to the 
definition of the objective seeking the development of the best 
artifact, then we have the evaluation phase with the use of the 
artifact for the solution of the problem By evaluating the 
effectiveness/efficiency and ending with the communication of its 
outcome, it can be done or back to the construction phase.
(Vidgen et al. 2012)
Implements three research cycles:
• The review cycle begins research in an application context by 
providing the requirements for research and defines the criteria for 
acceptance of the evaluation of the research results;
• The rigor cycle provides scientific knowledge for the research 
project in order to ensure its innovation;
• Design cycle iterates through the main activities of the 
construction and evaluation of design artifacts and research 
processes.
(Hevner et al. 2004)
New look or a set of analytical techniques that allow the 
development of research in the various areas, particularly in 
engineering. The DSR aims to study, research and investigate the 
artifact and its behaviour, both from academic and organisational 
perspective. Accordingly, the DSR is a rigorous process of 
designing artifacts to resolve problems, assessing what was designed 
or what is functioning and communicating the results obtained
(Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2011)
Summary Table of Research Methods: Characterization and Applicability
Design Science Research 
(DSR)
DS Evolution
Main purpose of creating 
artifacts, ensuring rigour and 
transparency so that the 
knowledge obtained in 
addition to technological, 
scientific and aims to respond 
to the questions formulated in 
the search for the expected 
outcome.
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2.1.4.3 Case Study Research (CSR) 
 
 
Table 4. Case Study (CSR) Research Summary 
 
The CSR defines himself by stages where on the first four(4) can be considered preparation 
and the final two(2) the data collection, analysis and final considerations and reporting. 
 
 
Figure 6. Case Study Research (Nabukenya 2012) 
Research Method Characterization Applicability
• Phenomenon observed in its natural environment;
• Data collected using various means (direct and indirect 
observations, interviews, questionnaires, audio and video logs, 
journals, letters, among others);
• One or more entities (person, group, organisation) are analyzed;
• The complexity of the unit is studied thoroughly;
• Research directed at the stages of exploration, classification and 
development of assumptions of the knowledge building process;
• Experimental forms of control or manipulation are not used;
• The investigator does not need to specify the set of dependent and 
independent variables in advance;
• The results strongly depend on the power of integration of the 
investigator;
• Changes may be made to the selection of the case or data 
collection methods as the investigator develops new hypothesis;
• Research involved with issues "how?" and "Why?" unlike "What?" 
and "How many?" 
 (Benbasat, I., Goldstein, DK and Mead 1987) 
Empirical research that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not so evident., and may be classified 
as predominantly qualitative and observatory, (Nabukenya 2012).
Look at social reality through a range of techniques, as interviews, 
observations, investigations and data gathering, constituting a "... 
means of organizing the social data by preserving the unitary 
character of the studied social object... an approach that considers 
any social unity as a whole [...] [E] includes the development of this 
unit, which can be a person, a family or a social group, a set of 
relationships or processes (such as family crises, adjustment to 
illness, friendship formation, ethnic invasion of a neighbourhood 
etc.) or even a culture [...], (Goode and Hatt 1958)
Uunderstand, explore or 
describe complex events and 
contexts with the 
involvement of several 
factors being widely used in 
the studies of an 
interpretative/qualitative 
nature, but also in 
quantitative and qualitative 
studies
Case Study Research 
(CSR)
Summary Table of Research Methods: Characterization and Applicability
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2.1.4.4 Action Research (AR) 
 
 
Table 5. Action Research (AR) Research Summary 
 
Looking at AR cycle, we see an endless improvement loop that starts with the problem 
identification and ends with results evaluation and next steps. 
 
 
Figure 7. Action Research (AR) Cycle (Noffke & Stevenson, 1995, p. 2) 
 
 
 
 
Research Method Characterization Applicability
Process in which participants examine
their own educational practice systematically and carefully,
using the techniques of research. It is based on the
following assumptions:
• Teachers and principals work best on problems
they have identified for themselves
• Teachers and principals become more effective
when encouraged to examine and assess their
own work and then consider ways of working
differently
• Teachers and principals help each other by
working collaboratively
• Working with colleagues helps teachers and
principals in their professional development
(Watts, 1985, p. 118)
Work that did not separate the investigation from the action needed 
to solve the problem.
(McFarland & Stansell, 1993, p. 14).
Cyclical process involving a “non-linear pattern of planning, acting, 
observing, and reflecting on the changes in the social situations” 
(Noffke & Stevenson, 1995, p. 2).
Summary Table of Research Methods: Characterization and Applicability
Action Research (AR)
Action research happens at 
the place where these 
questions arise, it happens 
where the real action is taking 
place and it allows for 
immediate action.
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2.1.4.5 Comparison Analysis  
Based on (Nabukenya 2012) and (Hevner et al. 2004),  The comparison of the main research 
methodologies, previously considered, enables the distinction between them based on the 
following criteria: 
• Knowledge Base 
• Empirical Knowledge 
• Researcher Role 
• Researcher / Object of Study Collaboration 
• Objectives 
• Main Tasks 
• Results 
• Results Evaluation 
• Methods 
• Deployment 
 
 
Table 6.  Research Methodologies - Comparison 
 
The main differences can be identified in the knowledge base, objectives, results in the 
evaluation, in the role of the researcher and the necessity of an empirical basis (based on 
experience). Design Science and Design Science research are very identical, but the second 
operational as things should be. The case study aims to assist the understanding of phenomena 
and action research focuses on solving a particular problem arising from knowledge. 
 
 
Components
                        / 
                         Research Method
Design Science 
(DS)
Design Science Research 
(DSR)
Case Study Research 
(CSR)
Action Research 
(AR)
Knowledge Base - How things should be - Operates how things should be - How things are or how they behave
- How things are or how they 
behave
Empirical Knowledge - Not required - Not required - Required - Required
Researcher Role - Artifact Builder and Constructor - Artifact Builder and Constructor - Observer
- Multiple, 
depending on the type of Action 
Research
Researcher / Object of Study 
Collaboration - Not required - Not required - Not required - Required
- Develop artifacts that 
allow satisfactory 
solutions to practical 
problems
- Develop artifacts that allow 
satisfactory solutions to practical 
problems
 - Assist in understanding 
Complex social phenomena
- Solve or explain problems of a 
given System giving rise to 
knowledge
-  Prescribe -  Prescribe - Explore - Outputs practice and theory
- Design - Design - Describe - Explore, describe and explain
- Operationalization - Explain
- Raise awareness - Raise awareness - Define conceptual structure - To plan
- Suggest - Suggest - Plan - Collect data
- Develop - Develop - Pilot project - Analyze data
- Evaluate - Evaluate - Analyze the data - Implement
- Conclude - Conclude - Final report - Evaluate
- Continuous monitoring
- Artifacts - Artifacts - Constructors - Constructors
- Constructors - Constructors - Hypotheses - Hypotheses
- Models - Models - Descriptions - Descriptions
- Methods - Methods - Explanations - Explanations
- Instantiations - Instantiations - Actions
- Applications - Applications - Confronting the theory - Confronting the theory
- Simulations - Simulations
- Proof of Concept - Proof of Concept
Methods - Qualitative and / or Quantitative - Qualitative and / or Quantitative - Qualitative - Qualitative
Deployment - Not required - Not required - Not applicable - Required
Results Evaluatioon
Research Methologies - Comparison Table
Results
Objectives
Main Tasks
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2.1.4.6 Main Research Methodologies Analysis Conclusion 
The analysis of the four(4) main methodologies highlights: 
• Case Study Research(CSR) or Action Research(AR) can be used for descriptive, 
explanatory or predictive research objectives; 
• For prescriptive objectives or technology artifacts development, Design Science 
Research(DSR) is a more appropriate strategy; 
• Case Study Research(CSR) could be used for prescriptive or objective development to 
enable the comprehension of existing artifacts; 
 
Design Science Research targets investigation questions related to the rigor and the body of 
knowledge for which the research project contributes. As the main objective, overcome the 
limitations of both human and organizational capacities, creating new artifacts or developing 
existing artifacts. 
 
Due to the nature of the present work, technological domain, the most applicable research 
methodology is Design Science Research(DSR), that validates the work against the scientific 
research criteria. On the variation Qualitative, Design Science Research(DSR) reveal himself to 
be more adaptable to the environment and nature of the investigation. 
2.2 Domain Contextualization: 
In this chapter, a contextualization of the domain, expressed by several authors, will add the 
necessary supporting knowledge base to enable different technical backgrounds to access to the 
contents of the work. Additionally, a general overview of literature that is contextual to this work 
aims a background vision about information security and dominant strategies concerning the 
first line of defense against cyber-attacks. 
 
Main Artifacts: 
• Relevant actors 
• Cyber-Threats Types 
• Advanced Persistent Threat (ATP) 
2.2.1 Relevant actors 
2.2.1.1 Information Security (IS) Team 
Playing the role of the perimeter defender, implementing the IS security strategy, defined 
and approved by the management. The IS Team as two main skill sets and subdivided into two 
main teams, the Blue and the Red Teams. 
From the military, the Blue Team is the “regular” forces, Database Administrator (DBA), 
Systems Architect (SA), Infrastructure Manager (IFM), Network Manager (NTM) and other 
peer roles. On the other side, the highly skilled and organized Red Team, which adopts an 
attacker’s mindset. (Mirkovic et al., 2008). 
 
  
 
 
13 
 
2.2.1.2  Attackers 
2.2.1.2.1 Black hat hacker 
Black hat hackers, or simply “black hats,” are characterized by an intrusive attitude aiming 
to break the IS protective layer for personal or organization gain (credit card numbers, 
intellectual property or personal data for sale). Another goal is the attacks against websites for 
real service disruption. The black hat hacker's goal is to find a new, “zero-day” security 
vulnerability that would be attractive for the criminal organizations or to use to compromise 
computer systems (Bratus, 2007). 
2.2.1.2.2 White hat hacker(WHH) 
White hat hackers are experts in IS systems, use their abilities for good, ethical, and legal 
purposes rather than wrong, unethical, and criminal purposes. 
IS Teams include on his Red Team white-hat hackers responsible for testing the perimeter just 
as a black hat hacker would. This approach is known as “penetration testing.” 
A white hat hacker who finds “zero-day” security vulnerability would disclose it to the 
organization, allowing them to apply the necessary patch (Bratus, 2007). 
2.2.1.2.3 Gray hat hacker 
The definition point us to someone that mixes a black and white profiles, they perform with 
a white hat mindset, but they may, technically, commit crimes and do arguably unethical things. 
A gray hat hacker might attempt to compromise a computer system, without permission, 
informing the organization after the fact and allowing them to patch the system. The gray hat 
tries to compromise an IS without permission, which is illegal (Bratus, 2007). 
2.2.2 Cyber-Threats 
Based on the State of Cyber Security: Emerging Threats Landscape Paper, (Ahmad, Yunos, 
Sahib, & Yusoff, 2015). 
2.2.2.1  Phishing and email Spamming 
Phishing and email Spamming defines a type of threat through the internet, or flooding of 
the Internet or any unwanted online correspondences. The requests gather client’s credentials 
using a deception technique. Phishing is an Internet fraud in such a way that the attacker will 
acquire details like stealing passwords, credit card numbers, bank account details, and other 
private information. In recent times, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary appear to be 
taking cybercrime more seriously.  
2.2.2.2  Botnet 
A Botnet is a guard of compromised Systems, sometimes called “zombies,” that are under 
the command and control of a solitary “Botmaster.”. A botnet is an accumulation of computers 
networked together that are no doubt regulated by Cyber-criminals for malicious and unlawful 
purposes. Botnets are currently turning into a key threat for the cyber-crime since they are 
designed deliberately to disturb targeted computer systems. Many infected computers can figure 
out how to disturb and disseminate malicious code, virus, and spam. 
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2.2.2.3  Malware and Spyware 
These are a malicious program designed to gather computer information without the 
awareness of the client. Malware is one of the key threats to Businesses, Governments, and 
people. For instance, in 2009 the number of new malware signatures was accounted to be just 
under 2.9 million, a 71 percent increase over 2008, yet Symantec discovered more than 286 
million new malware variants in 2010.  
2.2.2.4  Keyloggers 
Keyloggers are programs that can screen and record the client keyboard information while 
typing in Computer System for later access. Key loggers store the data or send the information 
secretly to the other programs. They can record user names, messages and secret key for remote 
systems and computer application. Some key loggers oblige the right to gain access to the 
criminal invader or attacker to get the data from the machine while other forcefully transfers the 
data to different machines using email; file transfers and so forth. Sagiroglu and his Colleagues 
further find out that the personal use of keyloggers can be beneficial, because the use of culture 
may assist private computer owner to enhance his daily routine with much privacy. By using a 
keylogger is possible to recuperate content wrote into word processors, spreadsheets, and 
computer programming environment after an application or system crash. 
2.2.2.5  Social Engineering 
Social engineering is a kind of technique in which it traps or tricks the client to reveal 
valuable information. The user will think the reason is honest to goodness yet the aim is truly 
criminal. “SE relies on the trusting nature of individuals as it depends on getting unapproved 
secret information through mimicking people using Nontechnical means; Consequently, the SE 
is viewed as the human side of breaking into a corporate network.” (Okenyi & Owens, 2007). 
2.2.2.6  Denial of Service 
Denial of Service is an attack that upsets the normal function of the computer system and 
thus prevents access to authorized users. DoS is an incident in which a Client or organization is 
deprived of the services of a resource they would regularly expect to have. DOS is legitimately a 
resource overloading attack that may have the likelihood of either smashing the host such that it 
cannot communicate properly with the rest of the System, in this way the services may remain 
inaccessible to customer clients. 
2.2.2.7  Virus 
A virus is a program that spreads itself from one computer to another computer without the 
users’ authorization to do so, and they distribute themselves to the infected files or programs on 
a PC. Viruses cause a negative and unforeseen event when the machine runs. Different kind of 
viruses has a distinctive purpose. Some are designed to trap clients, and some are designed to 
destruct Machine programs. They can harm computer programs, and they activate himself 
through email attachments. Consequently, computer viruses can additionally spread by 
connecting itself to executable files of systems areas, to external storage devices such as USB 
drives. 
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2.2.2.8  Worm 
A worm is usually a computer Program that moves from one machine environment, then 
onto the next machine environment often keeping a record of the last environment, it has entered. 
Worms are self-duplicating programs towards oneself, which essentially implies that they do not 
require a host program to attack a victim. When a worm moves to another environment, it can 
do whatever it needs as per the obligatory access controls. In the case of Virus, it requires human 
intervention, but worms do not, and it moves around via the internet connection.”. 
2.2.3 Advanced Persistent Threat (ATP) 
An APT is characterized as continuous computer hacking that is actively supported by 
several people that usually targets one specific entity. They are engineering their attack to breach 
the perimeter defense successfully. 
 
Their goal is to place malware (spyware) on one or more computer elements for an extended 
period, to utilize these items to seek out valuable information for compromise actively, and then 
to extract (exfiltrate) that information. Persistent means that they almost always have a specific 
target in mind and they are continually working to move their objectives forward. ATP is an attack 
targeted from the very beginning. 
 
The cyber-defense teams still don’t have new tools that enable them to discover APTs or 
zero-day events before the severe damage occurs.  
 
APTs move silently through the organization and steal data which they target and discover.  
 
APTs only need one entry point to get past the perimeter defense. 
 
Once inside, most of the legacy technology will not detect their movement in areas such as 
the Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN).  
 
APTs can move silently within the corporate network and can remain undetected for months 
or even years. 
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2.3 Knowledge Areas: 
• Cyberspace 
• Information Warfare 
• Cyber Attack 
• Cyber Event 
• Cyber Terrorism 
• Network Security and Cyber Security Differences 
• Tactical Deception 
2.3.1 Cyberspace 
The cyberspace as becoming the area where all organizations need to be to do business, 
additionally, social media, email, and other technologies are also being used by many. This 
reality opens opportunities for attackers to strike effectively, inexpensively with little risk. Also, 
states and non-state actors turn to cyberspace to conduct warfare with greater frequency 
(Gervais, 2012).  
 
Kuehl, (n.d.) collected and analyzed the various definitions leading him to conclude that 
cyberspace is more than just computers and digital information and that there are several aspects 
of cyberspace: 
• Operational 
Organizations use cyberspace to do business and drive behavior 
• Information based 
Cyberspace is used to create, store, modify and exchange information 
• Networking 
The existence of networks enables information and assets communication  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Cyberspace is everything out there (Source Shutterstock) 
 
 A global domain within the information environment whose distinctive and unique character is 
framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, 
exchange and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected networks using 
information-communication technologies.” 
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2.3.2 Information Warfare 
“The strategic, operational, and tactical level competitions across the spectrum of peace, 
crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, war termination, and reconstitution/restoration, waged 
between competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means to achieve their 
objectives.” (Libicki, 1995). 
 
Figure 9. Information Warfare, different forms (Source Radiantskies) 
 
Denning (1999) argues that information warfare can occur in some domains such as crime, 
individual rights, and national security.  
 
Kopp (2000) states that the aim of information warfare is to, “corrupt, deny, degrade and 
exploit adversary information and information systems and processes while protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of one's information.” Information warfare is 
particularly impacting the world order in the sense that intellectual/military property is being 
used to target nations and organizations in such a way that business advantage and military 
dominance are just two clicks away from being destroyed.   
2.3.3 Cyber Attack 
 Based on (Okenyi & Owens, 2007) 
 
A cyber attack is the core building block that is common to all hostile cyber situations. The 
cyber attack is defined as follows: 
• An act in cyberspace that could reasonably be expected to cause harm. 
o Harm is defined in its broadest sense: economic, psychological, physical, 
reputational, strategic and so on 
Intent 
The intent behind that attack is characterized as follows: 
• Warfare; Achieving military objectives 
• Crime; Personal gain through illegal means 
• Bullying;  Causing psychological distress to another individual 
• Espionage; Obtaining political or military information 
• Terrorism; Influence a nation's policies and decisions through violence and fear 
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Actor 
The entity that carried out the cyber-attack must also be considered alongside the intent. 
Consideration of the actor improves the chances of coming to a correct conclusion on their intent. 
If the actor is a state, a conclusion of warfare-like intent would arguably be easier to reach than 
if the actor was an individual. If the actor is a known terrorist group, findings of terrorism-like 
intent are arguably more feasible.  
2.3.4 Cyber Event 
Having considered the actor and the intent, we can define a cyber situation by comparing it 
to a non-cyber situation. For example, if a cyber attack was launched by a nation state with the 
intent of achieving a military objective, this cyber situation is defined as cyber warfare. If an 
individual launched a cyber attack with the intent of causing psychological distress to another 
individual, it could be concluded that cyberbullying has taken place. By following this method, 
we can define almost any cyber situation, including cyber warfare (Sabău-Popa, Bradea, Boloș, 
& Delcea, 2015).  
2.3.5 Cyber Terrorism 
The FBI define terrorism as: “Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal 
or state law and appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct 
of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. Cyber attacks where the 
intent is to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination or kidnapping.” (Sumner, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 10: CyberTerrorism Model (Source Journal of Information Security) 
 
Summer, (2009) refers to a cyber attack on a nuclear power plant with the intent of causing 
mass destruction would be cyber terrorism.  While assassination via cyber means may sound 
extreme, it is possible to envisage an air defense system being compromised by cyber means to 
target an aircraft it ordinarily would not.  
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2.3.6 Network Security and Cyber Security Differences 
Based on (Cisco, 2010) 
It is relevant for this dissertation understand the difference between Network Security and 
traditional Cyber Security, so the integration of the Deception technology makes sense as 
complementary and never as a replacement of any of the Network and Cyber Security 
components. 
 
       
Figure 11: Network Security (Source Reveille Systems, Inc)      Figure 12: Cyber Security (Source CB Insights) 
 
Network Security primary purpose is to keep the organization's Network safe from the inside.  
A set of processes, based on a Governance framework like ISO27001, COBIT among others, 
should be in place to fight all inside threats, as a baseline, we could have: 
 
• Password Policy 
o Password length and structure 
 Contain characters classes: 
• Upper case alphabetic (e.g. A-Z) 
• Lowercase alphabetic (e.g. a-z) 
• Numeric (e.g. 0-9) 
• Special characters (e.g.,! @#$%~) 
o Password blacklists 
• Example: Pa55word, Including name/employee id 
o Password duration 
 Depending on type of account but can be as short as one month 
• Internet access 
o Monitoring/Stopping the site's employees visit on the company's computers 
 Sites like Gmail/Cloud Storage sites/Gaming/Sexual Content 
• Encryption 
o Email using digital certificates, communications and file transfers outside the 
company 
• Backups 
o The scheduling of regular backups of company information in case of a hardware 
malfunction or successful outside threat 
Working Together but Different Responsabilities 
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• Scans 
o Conducting regular virus and malware scans to detect any dormant threat 
• Intrusion defense systems (IDS)  
o Deep view inside the network using a protocol analyzer approach 
o Detects policy violations, infections, information leakage, Configuration errors 
 
Cybersecurity focuses on the protection against outside threats by deploying a set of processes, 
based on a Governance framework like ISO27001, COBIT among others, that relies on specific 
software and Teams to keep the organizations safe.  
 
The two security layers should work together so the threats, both internals, and externals, are 
detected in time and recovery is possible in case of data loss. As baseline and adding to the 
Network Security layer, we could have: 
  
• Firewall 
o Cisco (2012), Network security device that monitors incoming and outgoing 
network traffic and decides whether to allow or block specific traffic based on a 
defined set of security rules uses the “Allow” default setting 
• Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) 
o Enforce a policy on what traffic is not allowed through, as the Firewall but with 
the “Deny” default setting 
o Block known attacks across a network using a set of known rules 
• Intelligence  
o External threat intelligence 
o Reputation-based rules discussion forum’s 
2.3.7 Tactical Deception 
To highlight the alignment between the IS Deception concept and the military Deception 
one, Fowler and Nesbitt (1995) suggest six general principles for effective tactical deception in 
warfare based on their knowledge of air-land warfare that can be used in information security 
warfare.  They are: 
• The deception should reinforce enemy expectations 
• The deception should have realistic timing and duration 
• The deception should be integrated with operations 
• The deception should be coordinated with concealment of true intentions 
• Deception realism should be tailored to the needs of the setting 
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2.4 Information Security Perimeter Defense Suite 
2.4.1 Top 10 technologies for IS 
Based on Gartner's Top Ten(10) Technologies for Information Security (Panetta, 2017). 
 
Figure 13. IS Adapted Historical Perimeter Defense Tactics (Source The Security Nige) 
 
The Knowledge Area chapter gave a flavor of the environment, crime trending and the 
differentiation between Network Security and Cyber Security, important to understand that 
threats can materialize from the inside or from the outside, cyberspace, of the organizations and 
that different policies and tools, exist with different objectives. The mentioned Cyber Incident 
is what all of the ISsecurity technologies are designed to stop from happening. 
 
For this work, the focus should be Cyber Security, but Network Security also plays a 
significant role to detect attackers lateral movement, meaning they are already inside the 
perimeter. A mixed top ten(10) Information Security technologies list and comparison table, 
along with a Deception technology insight, will drive a better understanding regarding 
Deception technology position among his technological peers when a Cyber Threat materializes 
into a Cyber Incident. 
 
A special remark concerning a non-inclusion on the top(10) Top 10 technologies for IS of 
typical IS like Firewall, IDS or IPS. By just looking at the current Cyber Crime, Cyber Terrorism 
and Cyber Attacks trend and figures we realize that they just don’t work, a new paradigm is 
needed and that’s what this work pretend to demonstrate. Just for the record, Firewall, Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) definitions: 
Firewall 
Is a network security device that grants or rejects network access to traffic flows between an 
untrusted zone (e.g., the Internet) and a trusted zone (e.g., a private or corporate network). The 
firewall acts as the demarcation point or “traffic cop” in the network, as all communication 
should flow through it and it is where traffic is granted or rejected access. Firewalls enforce 
access controls through a positive control model, which states that only traffic defined in the 
firewall policy is allowed onto the network; all other traffic is denied (known as “default deny”). 
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Intrusion Detection System (IDS)  
Is a network security technology originally built for detecting vulnerability exploits against 
a target application or computer. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) extended IDS solutions by 
adding the ability to block threats in addition to detecting them and has become the dominant 
deployment option for IDS/IPS technologies. This article will elaborate on the configuration and 
functions that define the IDS deployment.  
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
Is a network security/threat prevention technology that examines network traffic flows to 
detect and prevent vulnerability exploits. Vulnerability exploits usually come in the form of 
malicious inputs to a target application or service that attackers use to interrupt and gain control 
of an application or machine. Following a successful exploit, the attacker can disable the target 
application (resulting in a denial-of-service state), or can potentially access to all the rights and 
permissions available to the compromised application. 
 
2.4.1.1 Access Security Brokers 
Software as a Service (SaaS) apps, increasingly pervasive in enterprises, provide new 
challenges to security teams with their limited visibility and control options. Cloud Access 
Security Brokers (CASB) allow chief information security officers (CISOs) an opportunity to 
apply enterprise security policies across multiple cloud services.  
2.4.1.2 Endpoint Detection and Response 
Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions allow CISOs to detect potential security 
breaches and react quickly. These tools record endpoint and network events, and the data are 
continuously searched using known indicators of compromise (IOC) and machine-learning 
techniques for early identification of breaches.  
2.4.1.3 No signature Approaches to Endpoint Prevention 
Techniques such as memory protection and exploit prevention and machine learning-based 
systems, which uses mathematical models, augment ineffective signature-based approaches for 
malware prevention against advanced and targeted attacks.  
2.4.1.4 User and Entity Behavioral Analytics 
User and entity behavioral analytics provide user-centric analytics alongside information 
about networks, endpoints, and applications. 
2.4.1.5 Microsegmentation and Flow Visibility 
Microsegmentation, a more granular segmentation, stops attackers already in the system 
from moving laterally (“east/west”) to other systems. Visualization tools allow security teams 
to understand flow patterns, set segmentation policies and monitor for deviations. For data in 
motion, some vendors provide optional encryption of the network traffic.  
2.4.1.6 Security Testing for SOC 
As SOC integrates security into the workflow, emerging operating models offer an 
automated, transparent and compliant configuration of underlying security infrastructure based 
on policy reflecting the currently deployed state of the workloads. 
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2.4.1.7 Intelligence-Driven Security Operations Center Orchestration Solutions 
Intelligence-driven security operations centers (ISOCs) are designed to deal with the new 
“detection and response” paradigm. This solution requires the evolution of traditional security 
operation center (SOCs) to offer an adaptive architecture and context-aware components.  
2.4.1.8 Remote Browser 
Chief Information Security Officer (CISOs) can address malicious malware delivered via 
email, URLs or websites by isolating the browsing function from the endpoint and corporate 
network. The attack is done by remotely presenting the browser session from an on-site or cloud-
based “browser server.” The server sessions are reset to a known good state, and this technique 
reduces the surface area for an attack, shifting the risk to server sessions.  
2.4.1.9 Deception 
Deception tools, as the name implies, use deceit or tricks to thwart attacks. The security team 
creates fake vulnerabilities, systems, shares, and cookies to tempt attackers. Any real attack on 
these resources indicates to security teams an attack is occurring, as legitimate users will not see 
or need access to the fake systems.  
2.4.1.10 Pervasive Trust Services 
Security models must evolve alongside the projected pervasiveness of the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and increasing dependency on operational technology. Trust services can manage the 
needs of billions of devices with limited processing capability. More importantly, trust services 
are designed to scale and can offer secure provisioning, data integrity, confidentiality, devices 
identity and authentication.  
2.5 Deception Technology 
The Deception-based technology enables the organizations to quickly detect, analyze and 
defend organizational networks against real-time attacks. Deception technology provides 
accurate information on malware and malicious activity not detected by other types of cyber 
defense. 
 
 
Figure 14. Deception, Closing the Blind Spot (Source Attivo Networks) 
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Deception technology is a new category of cyber-security designed to meet head-on the 
threats of malicious software, targeted attacks, zero-day “exploits” and other sophisticated 
attacks. Deception technology provides for the broad scale deployment of a network of 
camouflaged malware traps that are interconnected with the enterprise’s real information 
technology resources. The traps appear identical in every way to the organization’s real assets. 
 
Once the malware has penetrated the enterprise, the attackers can move laterally to find high-
value targets. If the malware touches any one of the traps, they are detected. Deception 
technology then issues a high accuracy alert. Note that Deception technology alerts do not rely 
on a probabilistic event or clustering around adjustable thresholds. These are great confidence 
events.  The Deception technology enables the organizations to detect the attacks and data 
breach.  
 
Some implementation types isolate the malware, tries to decompile it and supply inoculation 
if a patch is available. The quality of the provided information enhances the quality of the cyber-
defense teams that can rapidly begin implementing the best path for remediation and removal. 
This work intends to explore Deception as a technology that could be strategic, effective 
detecting cyber-incidents.  
 
The information security model based on Deception technology automates the deployment of 
a network of camouflaged malware traps that are mixed with the real information technology 
resources. The traps appear identical in every way to any real IT assets. Once the organization is 
penetrated the attacker starts moving laterally to find high-value targets. Just one touch on trap 
by the attacker sets off a high confidence ALERT. Real-time automation isolates the malware 
used by the attacker and delivers a comprehensive assessment directly to the Red Teams. 
 
 
Figure 15. Deception and Decoys (Source Attivo Networks) 
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Deception technology is categorized into three basic classes of capability. 
• Legacy Deception technology has been around for years and utilizes the notion of hand 
deployed and individually implemented traps. 
• Basic Deception technology added some automation and reporting around honeypots.  
In this case, the operating systems and vendor applications must still install manually; this 
option is not practical for wide scale or widespread deployment. 
• Advanced Deception technology utilizes automation deploy a broad network of emulated 
computers, servers and in some cases devices (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) industrial control systems, medical devices, and so forth) and places these 
throughout your network. 
 
This technology brings effectiveness while at the same time reducing the cost well below the 
other implementation choices. 
 
Managed Security Service Providers (MSSP) have emerged to fill the gap in operations. They 
enable the enterprise to integrate new architectures such as Deception technology using the 
extended resources of the MSSP team. 
 
Based on (Cooke, 2010), 
• August 2016. Designs and data regarding India’s Scorpene submarines were leaked from 
the French shipbuilder DCNS. DCNS also builds submarines for Malaysia and Chile and 
recently won contracts to build submarines in Brazil and Australia. 
• February 2016: North Korea was suspected of hacking the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network and stealing $101 million from 
Bangladesh’s Central Bank. The DPRK is also blamed for hacking into banks in Ecuador, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam earlier this year. 
• May 2015. A hack of an online IRS system results in a $50 million loss, which the IRS 
blames on Russian hackers. 
• October 2011. Networks of 48 companies in the chemical, defense, and other industries 
were penetrated for at least six months by a hacker looking for intellectual property. Some 
of the attacks are attributed to computers in Hebei, China. 
 
The above incidents support the recognition by key government officials that large 
enterprises around the world have been under continued attack, and that most have not yet 
discovered that their networks are already penetrated. Executive staff and the board of directors 
have realized that our legacy information security tools are failing to keep attackers out of core 
information networks and enterprise mission critical infrastructure. Traditional security 
architectures have not proven to be capable enough to meet these threats. 
 
Cyber-malware attacks continue to grow dramatically with increasing impact across the 
corporate and government sectors. The damage has become overwhelming as the cost of a single 
attack continues to rise. 
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The APTs continue to emergence from well-funded nation states and criminal organizations. 
Organized crime has funded significant malware and malicious activity operations, becoming 
their core business. They have found that substantial investments in malware and malicious 
activity continue to produce significant returns on investment. Organized crime is manufacturing 
malware for profit and gain. Criminals can be thousands of miles away, yet reach out from any 
place in the world to steal classified information, divert funds and damage in several aspects. 
 
Organizations information security suite tools are unable to keep ATPs and advanced 
malware out of critical networks and infrastructure. Traditional security architectures are not 
dynamic enough to fight these threats. Attackers are very effective at engineering around the 
perimeter, endpoint, and anti-virus and basic intrusion detection systems in a variety of ways. 
Defense-in-depth cyber-security software suites continue to grow, but they are proving less and 
less effective against the new breed of malware and ATPs attacking core systems. Screening out 
99% of all threats is not enough. Organizations need to know how to find the last 1% of attackers 
or the net result of the enterprise will be the same. 
 
The strategy has turned to how to supplement existing cyber-defense suites so the 
organizations can detect the most of the attackers. Organizations are assuming a breach will 
happen.  
 
This traditional architecture is reactive and prone to false positives. The Blue Teams are 
flooded with information that they need to investigate. Repeatedly, Blue Teams waste their time 
on non-added value tasks, in more detail, going after situations that are not incidents, are not 
materializations of any threat. 
 
 
Figure 16. Deception, What You See Is Not What You Get (Source Attivo Networks) 
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The Deception technology complements both Network and Cyber Security into a more 
effective security strategy by reducing the false positives, profiling the attack, attacker and the 
ways of attack. Gathering information using profiling can be useful to feed an Information 
Security Data Lake that can act as input to the analytics tools generate knowledge. With this 
knowledge, the Blue and Red Teams can understand better the mechanics behind the threats and 
anticipate it.  
2.5 Information Security Technologies Comparison Table 
The IS Technologies under a Cyber Incident view will reveal the strong and weak aspects in 
terms of effectiveness, more readable version available at Appendix E: 
 
The calculation is ruled by the following criteria: 
• Zero (0); The Technology does apply to that particular Threat or effectiveness is Low 
• One (1); The Technology applies to that particular Threat and effectiveness is Medium 
• Three (3); The Technology applies to that particular Threat and effectiveness is High 
 
 
Table 7. Information Security Technologies Comparison Table  
Phishing and 
Email Spamming Botnet
Malware and 
Spyware Keyloggers
Social 
Engineering
Denial of 
Service Virus Worm
Advanced Persistent 
Threat (ATP)
Type of threat through the internet, 
or flooding of the Internet or any 
unwanted online correspondences
Guard of 
compromised 
Systems, 
sometimes called 
“zombies,” that are 
under the command 
and control of a 
solitary 
“Botmaster.”
Malicious program 
designed to gather 
computer 
information without 
the awareness of the 
client.
Programs that can 
screen and record 
the client keyboard 
information while 
typing in Computer 
System for later 
access.
Kind of 
technique in 
which it traps 
or tricks the 
client to reveal 
valuable 
information.
Attack that 
upsets the 
normal 
function of the 
computer 
system and 
thus prevents 
access to 
authorized 
users
Program that spreads 
itself from one 
computer to another 
computer without the 
users’ authorization 
to do so
Computer Program 
that moves from one 
machine 
environment, then 
onto the next 
machine 
environment often 
keeping a record of 
the last environment
Continuous computer 
hacking that is actively 
supported by several 
people that usually 
targets one specific 
entity.
Access Security Brokers 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Software as a Service (SaaS) apps, increasingly pervasive in enterprises, 
provide new challenges to security teams with their limited visibility and 
control options. Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB) allow chief 
information security officers (CISOs) an opportunity to apply enterprise 
security policies across multiple cloud services.
Endpoint Detection and Response 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 0 18
Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions allow CISOs to detect 
potential security breaches and react quickly. These tools record endpoint and 
network events, and the data are continuously searched using known 
indicators of compromise (IOC) and machine-learning techniques for early 
identification of breaches.
No signature Approaches to Endpoint Prevention 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 9
Techniques such as memory protection and exploit prevention and machine 
learning-based systems, which uses mathematical models, augment ineffective 
signature-based approaches for malware prevention against advanced and 
targeted attacks.
User and Entity Behavioral Analytics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
User and entity behavioral analytics provide user-centric analytics alongside 
information about networks, endpoints, and applications.
Microsegmentation and Flow Visibility 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 15
Microsegmentation, a more granular segmentation, stops attackers already in 
the system from moving laterally (“east/west”) to other systems. Visualization 
tools allow security teams to understand flow patterns, set segmentation 
policies and monitor for deviations. For data in motion, some vendors 
provide optional encryption of the network traffic.
Security Testing for DevOps 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8
As DevOps integrates security into the workflow (DevSecOps) emerging 
operating models offer an automated, transparent and compliant configuration 
of underlying security infrastructure based on policy reflecting the currently 
deployed state of the workloads.
Intelligence-Driven Security Operations Center Orchestration 
Solutions 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8
Intelligence-driven security operations centers (ISOCs) are designed to deal 
with the new “detection and response” paradigm. This solution requires the 
evolution of traditional security operation center (SOCs) to offer an adaptive 
architecture and context-aware components.
Remote Browser 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 1 0 10
CISOs can address malicious malware delivered via email, URLs or websites 
by isolating the browsing function from the endpoint and corporate network. 
The attack is done by remotely presenting the browser session from an on-site 
or cloud-based “browser server.” The server sessions are reset to a known 
good state, and this technique reduces the surface area for an attack, shifting 
the risk to server sessions.
Deception 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 25
Deception tools, as the name implies, use deceit or tricks to thwart attacks. 
The security team creates fake vulnerabilities, systems, shares, and cookies to 
tempt attackers. Any real attack on these resources indicates to security teams 
an attack is occurring, as legitimate users will not see or need access to the 
fake systems.
Pervasive Trust Services 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 0 18
Security models must evolve alongside the projected pervasiveness of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) and increasing dependency on operational 
technology. Trust services can manage the needs of billions of devices with 
limited processing capability. More importantly, trust services are designed to 
scale and can offer secure provisioning, data integrity, confidentiality, devices 
identity and authentication.
14 14 19 11 6 6 20 15 11
Cyber Incident Threats
Information Security Technologies
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2.6 Information Security Technologies Comparison Table Conclusions 
 
The Cyber Threat that receives less protection is Advanced Persistent Threat (ATP) due to his 
dynamic type, shifting shape and method very quickly, only Microsegmentation and Flow 
Visibility, User and Entity Behavioral Analytics and Deception scores on ATP high. 
 
Deception technology scores highest across the Information Security Technologies due to 
his technology that impersonates assets in the form of decoys. By triggering a real alarm upon 
being touched, the Deception decoy asset positioning himself systematically strong across the 
Cyber Threats.   
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Contextualization 
The elaboration of this work will obey to the Design Science Research (DSR), research on 
state of the art for related artifacts. 
3.2 Structural Question 
 
The following question is structural to substantiate the work: 
 
• Is Deception technology an effective and strategy to reduce Cyber Attacks? 
 
In order to answer the fundamental question the Environment, with the representation of the 
Organization IT like people, risks, security, and others, will cycle together with the scientific 
theories to generate Artifacts that can be evaluated and eventually implemented. 
 
As main artifacts, a Related Testimonial, Use-Case from a leading supplier of the 
technology, proof of concept and workout will support the Relevance sub-cycle 
 
 All available information will drive the understanding of the effectiveness and strategic 
value of the Deception Technology. 
 
3.3 Artifacts Definition  
3.3.1 Related Testimonial Artifact 
Identify a high ranked member of an organization, Information Security domain, that had 
implemented Deception technology and retrieved the thoughts and main messages regarding the 
technology. The identified organization is Interana, and the testimonial is given by Mark la 
Rosa, Solutions Architecture VP. Interana is a fast growing Bay Area software company that 
is defining and leading a new category of behavioral analytics for the digital economy, and his 
testimonial regarding Deception technology highlights some key aspects that add valuable 
information to this work. 
3.3.2 Use Case Artifact 
Identify a Use Case on the Health organizations space that highlights the behavior of the 
Deception technology under pressure. Regardless of several attempts to identify an academic 
based Use Case, that was not possible due to no sources were available. Based on the previous 
situation, the Use Case was selected by the Deception Technology Vendor bearing in mind the 
Health domain in use.  
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3.3.3 Proof of Concept Artifact 
Actors 
Sponsorship 
Based on the proximity between this dissertation coordinator and a top organization on the 
health domain, she will also act as the sponsor for the execution of the work. 
The Sponsor is Drª Carla Pereira. 
Organization 
A top organization on the health domain is to be engaged based on the criticality of the assets 
and the type of information under his protection, Protected health information (PHI). The 
relevance of the Deception technology will be under a heavy scrutiny by this type organization.  
The organization is SPMS.  
Deception Technology Vendor 
Top Deception Technology Vendor willing to setup a test environment relevant enough to 
retrieve practical conclusions regarding effectiveness. 
The Vendor is TrapX. (www.trapx.com) 
Organization Infrastructure Team  
A team from the organization, available to setup a test environment where the Deception 
technology is to be deployed. Team member’s identification is unknown. 
Organization Red Team  
A team from the organization, available to detect the test intrusion and reported it promptly. 
Team member’s identification is unknown. 
White Hat Hacker(WHH) 
WHH is responsible for taking control of the assets and retrieving information. 
The WHH is a top professional on the domain, responsible for the management of a Red Team 
for one of the top 15 organizations (Fortune 500 by Forbes). The identity is  classified for privacy 
reasons. 
Organization Management 
Persons from the Organization with proper roles in the Information Security space, 
CIO/CTO/Governance Leader/Compliance Leader/Risk Leader/Internal Audit. 
Gracefully available for the Proof-Concept and Workout, the CIO, Drº Rui Gomes and  
Governance Consultant, Drº Bruno Soares, ISACA Portugal Chapter President. 
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3.3.3.1 Proof of Concept Artifact 
The infrastructure should be deployed using a test environment; the setup must include: 
• Virtual network that will not expose real organization networks and assets, only 
accessible to the listed actors  
• Minimum two(2) real test workstations with standard organization images 
o A file labeled “M_SIG.txt” will reside on one of the workstations with the text 
“50033580” inside, content and location unknown for the WHH. The workstation 
is not infected with malware 
• One(1) database server, either SQL Server or Oracle Database Server 
o One(1) table labeled “M_SIG” with one(1) field and one(1) record, content of 
the record equal to “50033580”, unknown for the WHH 
• Deception technology Decoys 
o One(1) workstation based on the organization image 
o One(1) database server that matches the organization database server and naming 
policy 
• Remote access to the test environment to enable the WHH work 
• All organization security policies in place as normal deployment for real assets 
• Malware enabling remote control on a real test workstation  
3.3.3.3  Assumptions 
The Organization Red Team does not know that one of the workstation is infected and that 
a WHH has access to the test environment. Assuming that previous to Deception technology 
deployment an asset was compromised. The WHH does know that Deception technology is 
deployed but understands the type of organization involved. 
3.3.3.4 Modus Operandi (MO) 
The infrastructure setup completion will enable the WHH access the test. By the defined 
datetime and for the defined time length, both the WHH and the Organization Red Team will 
start working. The WHH knows the organization keyword that identifies valuable information, 
that keyword is “M_SIG.”  The exercise will stop when the defined time length expires, when 
the Organization Red Team detects the WHH or when the Deception technology detects the 
WHH. 
3.3.3.5 Objective 
The proof-concept will be considered successful if the WHH is detected by the Deception 
technology before the Organization Red Team. Other possible scenarios will be regarded as a 
failure for the Deception technology, like Organization Red Team detects first the WHH, the 
WHH download the “M_SIG.txt” file or access the Database and retrieve the content of the 
record.  
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3.3.4 Workout Artifact 
3.3.4.1 Actors 
Organization Management 
Persons from the Organization with proper roles in the Information Security space, 
CIO/CTO/Governance Leader/Compliance Leader/Risk Leader/Internal Audit. 
Gracefully available for the Proof-Concept and Workout, the CIO, Drº Rui Gomes and  
Governance and Compliance Consultant, Drº Bruno Soares, ISACA Portugal Chapter 
President 
Assumptions 
Available information regarding the Governance Model, the Information Security 
Architecture and other that may reveal himself relevant. 
Organization Management availability to be an active part of the workout. 
Objective 
Based on all the available information on this work, understand if Deception technology is 
strategic for the organization by matching his key features with the Governance Model and 
Information Security Architecture.  
3.4 The Plan (Initial) 
 
 
Figure 17. SPMS Initial Plan 
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4. Results 
 
As results, the Deception Technology related testimonial, Healthcare Hospital Use Case, 
SPMS Proof of Concept and SPMS Workout will highlight Deception Technology strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
4.1 Deception Technology related testimonial 
Mark la Rosa is a Solutions Architecture VP at Interana, Interana is a fast growing Bay Area 
software company that is defining and leading a new category of behavioral analytics for the 
digital economy, and his testimonial regarding Deception technology highlights some key 
aspects that add valuable information to the answer. 
“I run a solutions architecture team, and we are dealing with not only our data and our IPs and 
the code of our software, but we have customers that trust us with data for proof of concepts. 
What struck me about Deception was this idea of a honeypot and the idea of Deception 
technology, so using the same tactics as the hackers and use against them. I think that one of 
the big mistakes I see in corporate security is the fact that it's being done by corporate guys 
and they're not hackers, they don't think the same way in the same wavelength that a hacker 
would think and Deception really, to me, is almost like it was developed by the same sort of 
mindset of folks that would be perpetrating attacks, and that's the right way to do security, you 
got to have the correct mindset to understand how it works, what types of things did they'll 
try and how to really fake them out because they're going to know if it's not an obvious fake and 
what Deception is done so well is it it's nearly impossible to tell what's real and what's Deception 
decoys. It's a lot less expensive to deploy something like this than it is to have an entire team 
of people monitoring this 24/7 to make sure that these things aren't going down, so in my mind 
it's actually quite a good return on investment from buying the software vs. having people 
doing it and I also think that the way the implementation is done, the technology can do a better 
job than a person can because it's able to react a lot faster to what base does sifting through 
things that are very hard for people to see it in logs. Even if you have the best firewall in the 
world, there's going to be human errors, people are going to set things up improperly, someone 
will deploy a policy that is not correct, someone is gone to lose their password, and he or she 
left to take over a machine, these things will be going to happen! 
 
 
Figure 18: Human Error, eMail allowing the installation of Malware (RSA: 2011) 
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When I first started using Deception, I was really impressed with a couple of things, the first thing 
is, it was straightforward for me to set it up to simulate actual traffic I could literally just go 
in there and point click and say I want to put a SQL server here, and I want to put a fake web 
server here, and I want a fake file-share here, and I can literally just go in and set up a network 
that looks just like mine network that was all fake and it would even send traffic back and 
forth. Is one of those things that is almost that insurance policy that you know is out there and the 
least you have to do with it, the better really and that's the great thing about it, you really do know 
that this thing will email me and I'm going to get a phone call if in case of an incident. It is one 
of those things where I can put it out of my mind and focus on other things that matter to our 
business.” 
 
Mark’s testimonial contribution touches on several important aspects, the reality of some 
organizations that not only they need to protect his information but also customer’s information, 
increasing the Risk exposure. 
 
That Deception technology is changing the attack paradigm by allowing the Red teams to 
incorporate much more information on the defense and counter-attack. 
 
The human error is always present in any activity and is exactly, along with other 
possibilities,  that mistake that attackers will leverage. 
 
Deception technology is a concept easy to understand and implement, importantly, Mark  
deploy his decoys and set up the Deception grid, meaning no special technical teams from the 
supplier is needed, with the associated savings to the organizations. 
 
Information Security models are, sometimes, defined by teams that do not have the all the 
necessary knowledge on how attackers work. 
 
The tradeoff between large Blue teams analyzing the thousands of security logs and the risk 
of failure are not adding any value to the organization. 
 
Mark considers a good return on investment because huge Blue teams no longer are 
necessary 
 
As final thoughts is vital that people in his type of position, VPs, will need to focus on adding 
value to the organizations instead of dealing with false positives. Deception Technology, if 
deployed, will enable that. 
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4.2 Healthcare, Hospital Use Case 
HEALTHCARE HOSPITAL LABORATORY MEDJACK, TrapX (Chosen to be aligned with 
SPMS type of business) 
Background 
This hospital case study focuses on a healthcare institution (anonymous due to privacy 
reasons) with Deception technology implemented. Before Deception technology, there were no 
indicators of malware infection or persistent threats visible to the hospital. The customer 
had an unyielding industry suite of cyber defense products. The suite included a strong 
firewall, intrusion detection (heuristics based), endpoint security, anti-virus and more. The 
healthcare information technology team included a team with several highly competent and 
experienced cyber technologists. It is important to understand the environment in which a 
device such as a blood gas analyzer is used. Blood gas analysis is often used with patients within 
critical care. They are often in the intensive care unit and under duress, perhaps even in a struggle 
for their lives. 
 
After the implementation of the Deception technology, within a short window of time, 
several alerts to malicious activity within the networks was detected. Upon inspection, it 
became apparent that this was a form of persistent attack and forensic evidence showed that 
the attacker continued to move through the hospital’s networks looking for appropriate targets. 
The Deception technology enabled the Red Team to identify the source of this lateral 
movement. The intrusion comes from three (3) of the hospital blood gas analyzers present in the 
hospital laboratory. These were all infected separately and had now enabled three separate 
backdoors into the hospital networks. 
 
The lateral movement before Deception technology implementation may have allowed the 
infection of one of the hospital IT department’s workstations. It was identified this infection 
point separately, and forensics points to a connection with the blood gas analyzers infection. It 
was determined that confidential hospital data be being exfiltrated to a location within the 
European Community. Although the data breach was identified, there is still uncertainty around 
how the attacker successfully exfiltrated many data records in total.  
 
Once an attacker established a backdoor within a target, blood gas analyzer, or any other 
medical device, almost any form of manipulation of the unencrypted data stored and flowing 
through the device is possible. 
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Backdoors across the network allowing the attacker 
lateral move, targeting valuable assets. 
 
From a starting point, blood gas analyzer, infections 
were spreading, even an Information Technology 
was infected 
 
   
Confidential hospital data was being exfiltrated 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 19: Hospital Use Case (TrapX: 2015) 
 
This Use Case exposes several organization concerns, in this case, the situation was critical 
because the infected devices were life support type ones, used with patients within critical care. 
4.2.1 Main Considerations: 
Based on a FireEye, FireEye is the intelligence-led security company with over 5,800 
customers across 67 countries and including more than 40 percent of the Forbes Global 2000. 
The intrusion detection time is 146 days for the US and an impressive 469 for EMEA, 81% of 
the intrusions are not detected, organizations are sometimes aware of that fact when becomes 
public or when the authorities/regulators act in the form of fines or prison time for the 
Management. 
 
The hospital Information Security was built upon a strong industry suite of cyber defense 
products and a team of several highly competent and experienced cyber technologists, despite 
all, the suite of cyber defenses didn’t detect the previous attack that installed the trapdoor. The 
Deception technology was able to detect, within a short window of time, several intrusion alerts, 
invisible to the hospital Blue and Red Teams. 
 
That confidential hospital data was being exfiltrated, by not knowing that the hospital could not 
activate the response teams, mainly Red Teams to stop the attack. Other teams will definitely be 
thankful for any in-time warning of that fact, among others: 
• Board of Directors, to manage market/regulatory expectations 
• Internal Audit Team, to incorporate the cyber-incident on the Audit model 
• Communication Team, to prepare a public statement 
• Legal Team, to prepare for legal processes 
• Privacy Team, to prepare identification of the lost confidential data 
• Risk Team, to increase risk level and calculate new risk appetite 
• Compliance Team, to prepare regulatory response 
• Finance Team, to prepare for possible fines   
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Regardless of the strong investment on Information Security, a suite of software and Teams, 
this hospital was not able to detect an attack with three (3) infection points enabling backdoors 
for attackers. 
 
Deception technology was effective in intrusion detection and forensics information retrieval, 
for a brief period, the Blue/Red Teams started receiving intrusion alerts that reveal himself true 
incidents that required real actions.  
 
The information retrieved by Deception technology pointed to a fact, confidential hospital 
data was being exfiltrated to a location within the European Community, the fine tuning provided 
by the technology delimited the physical space where the information, first, was stored.    
 
This Use Case was a successful history where Network/Cyber Security components 
complemented by Deception technology was able to identify and stop an attack in progress. 
 
4.3 SPMS Proof of Concept 
A proof of concept involving the deployment of Deception technology within a test 
environment was discussed with SPMS management. The goal was to test in a controlled 
environment the effectiveness of the technology and evaluate the concepts against reality.  
 
A Deception technology vendor along with a White Hat Hacker was engaged and ready, a 
plan and description of the steps were defined. 
  
Due to the latest cyber threats, the entire SPMS infrastructure activated his high-risk situation 
plan and is under a lockdown protocol.  
 
The access to all network devices for proof of concepts or experimentations involving SPMS 
assets is blocked.   
 
SPMS Management didn’t approve the proof of concept based on the criticality of the 
information security environment. 
 
Based on this situation, the conclusions are only based on the related testimonial, Use Case, 
and SPMS Workout. 
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4.4 SPMS Workout  
 
During the dissertation planning, the inclusion of an organization in the healthcare space 
was the first choice for the Deception technology thematic proof of concept. The main factor for 
this choice was the type of information managed by this kind of organization, mainly: 
 
• Personal Identifiable Information (PII) (Infosec Institute, n.d.) 
This information can identify an individual. According to a definition by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), PII is information about an individual 
maintained by an agency which: 
o Can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity based on identifiers, 
such as name, date of birth, biometric records, social security number; and 
o Additional information that may identify a person – that is medical, financial, 
employment and educational information 
• Protected Health Information (PHI) 
PHI is any information on a health condition that can be linked to a specific person 
 
Handling this type of information requires extra security measures. Additionally, life support 
and diagnostics devices are also under SPMS management. 
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SPMS Main Areas of Intervention are: 
 
 
Figure 20: SPMS 2014-2016(last version) Strategic Plan 
 
The identified target for the proof of concept was the Information Systems Unit, 
Communications, Infrastructure, Production, and Security Department, Managed by Drº Rui 
Gomes, teaming with Drº Bruno Soares, ISACA Portugal Chapter President and principal SPMS 
consultant for Information Technology Governance and Information Security. 
 
The following strategic topics were identified: 
• Reinforce authority on IT and Sourcing 
• Move closer service delivery and Heath Minister/National Health Service 
• Reinforce reputation and branding 
• Strengthen finance sustainability by different sources usage 
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To understand if Deception technology is strategic, the SPMS Risk and Information 
Security Framework was subject to the principal components analysis: 
 
 
Figure 21: SPMS Risk and Information Security Framework 
 
The SPMS overall objectives refer to risk management and compliance with legal, external 
and internal standards. The information systems objectives inherit the overall objectives and 
bound it to his domain.   
 
 
ISO 27799:2016 Address the special information security 
management needs of the health sector and its unique operating 
environments.  
 
While the protection and security of personal information are 
important to all individuals, corporations, institutions, and 
governments, there are special requirements in the health sector that 
need to be met to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, auditability, 
and availability of personal health information. 
 
The risks scenarios were build based on the threats, like malware 
and logic attacks, data access and lost/stolen, governed by ISO 
27799:2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. SPMS Risk Scenarios 
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Figure 23: SPMS Information System Management Controls 
 
The governance model covers all the main domains, relevant for information security, and 
integrates the controllership component of ISO/IEC 27001:2013, in more detail, the ESS.05 
Control (Security Services Management). 
 
SPMS integrate several reference frameworks and the decision to shape his Governance 
model was based on those frameworks.  
 
 
Figure 24: Risk Management Lifecycle 
 
 
By using the most relevant, applicable, mandatory components of each framework, SPMS 
guarantees a strong strategy definition, alignment with the objectives, the reinforcement of his 
authority on IT, and establishes the basis for an effective Risk Management. 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Figure 25. SPMS Governance, Controllership and Service Delivery Frameworks 
 
The procedures and processes are based on reference frameworks like: 
• COBIT 5 (http://www.isaca.org/Cobit/pages/default.aspx) 
o COBIT 5 framework for the governance and management of enterprise IT is a 
leading-edge business optimization and growth roadmap that leverages proven 
practices, global thought leadership and ground-breaking tools to inspire IT 
innovation and fuel business success. 
• ITIL (https://www.itil.org.uk/) 
o ITIL is a globally recognized best practice methodology for IT service 
management which is used all over the world by organizations to ensure that 
their IT services are aligned to the needs of their business. ITIL provides trusted 
guidance on how businesses can use their IT services to support their goals and 
facilitate business growth. 
• ISO 27001 (https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html) 
o ISO 27001 specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, 
maintaining and continually improving an information security management 
system within the context of the organization. It also includes requirements for 
the assessment and treatment of information security risks tailored to the needs 
of the organization. The requirements set out in ISO/IEC 27001:2013 are generic 
and are intended to apply to all organizations, regardless of type, size or nature. 
• HIPAA (https://www.hipaa.com/) 
o HIPAA establishes national standards for electronic health care transactions. 
HIPAA reflects a move away from cumbersome paper records and an increased 
emphasis on the security and privacy of Health data. 
• SANS (https://www.sans.org/) 
o SANS is the most trusted and by far the largest source for information security 
training in the world 
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4.5 SPMS Plan (Updated) 
 
 
Figure 26. SPMS Plan Updated 
Tasks not executed 
due to SPMS 
Infrastructure 
Lockdown Mode 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Revisiting this work question: 
• Is Deception technology effective and strategic to reduce Cyber Attacks? 
 
So one of the goals is to understand Deception Technology components and behavior, where 
he is positioned on the information security landscape and evaluate the effectiveness when 
targeted by a cyber treat that materializes into a cyber-incident. 
 
Based especially on the SPMS Workout, was a shared understanding that Deception 
Technology could play a major role by feeding the Governance model with the necessary 
evidence that a process is in place and is effective, fulfilling internal/external audit and risk, 
either operational or enterprise. In more detail, this technology will address the Risk Scenarios 
requirements and align with the Governance control requirements helping to enable the 
organization goals. 
 
One of the SPMS Workout conclusions was made by Drº Rui Gomes, that considered 
Deception Technology a strategic artifact to integrate the SPMS Information Technology 
Governance Model. 
 
The second goal touches the strategic value of the Deception Technology when facing an 
organization governance model.  
 
Deception Technology does not position himself inside the “stop an attack” type of 
information security suite of tools like for example, firewall or anti-virus, on the contrary, 
Deception Technology value are shown when the perimeter is penetrated, the attacker is already 
inside the organization network, and assets are already compromised.   
 
The paradigm changes with Deception Technology, no longer the organizations plan and act 
based on the illusion that the attacks can be stopped but with the certainty that, almost for sure, 
the attackers will get through either by exploiting a zero-day vulnerability or a simple human 
error. 
 
Looking at the available results, Deception Technology exposed several theoretical strengths 
that can be used to reduce Cyber Attacks. 
 
One is the ability to fast detect an intrusion allowing the Blue and Red Teams to react in 
time and stop the attack from spreading. This is a major breakthrough when compared with the 
endless hours looking to event logs produced by the traditional defense tools.  
 
Other is acting as the first line of defense, by detecting malware attacks and intrusions, among 
others, ensuring forensics evidence of any lost/stolen information and overall threats to an 
organization information/infrastructure.  
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The amount of high-quality information generated by the Deception Technology can be used 
to feed the Information Security repository that could be utilized in the Risk scenarios 
build/discussion, Analytics, to predict next attacks and improve defense robustness.  
 
Drº Bruno Soares also concluded, SPMS Workout, that cognitive security, self-learning 
systems that use data mining, machine learning, natural language processing and human–
computer interaction to mimic the way the human brain works, is the next logical/mandatory step 
when facing ATPs. Here, Deception Technology can play a major role, based on the high-quality 
data generated.   
 
 
 
Figure 27. SPMS Information Technology Artifacts 
 
SPMS Security Architecture could integrate Deception Technology to improve defense 
robustness and comply with internal Goals and Regulatory Requirements.  
 
The high-quality data generated can feed security repositories to increase response levels 
and enable cognitive security approach. 
 
 
  
 
 
46 
 
Workwise, the final conclusions in terms of the effectiveness and strategic, theoretical 
values, are summarized as follows. 
 
5.1.1 Effective? 
Deception technology, integrated into the Network and Cyber Security technologies, delivers 
what’s expected by successfully detecting cyber-attacks coming from the cyberspace or within 
the internal network.  
 
Today’s violent acts, like cyber terrorism, are not an isolated occurrence but part of an 
information warfare reality that touches not only governments but all organizations. 
 
5.1.2 Strategic? 
The SPMS Workout revealed that Deception technology as a positive strategic impact, by his 
integration on the Governance Model and contributor to SPMS objectives.  
 
The SPMS Governance model is structured on reference frameworks that majority relies on 
a set of controls, here, the Deception technology is one more artifact that can provide the 
necessary evidence of monitoring and compliance as required by “Appendix B – SPMS Programa 
de Melhoria Contínua do Risco e Segurança da Informação.” 
 
Deception technology can also integrate globally with “Appendix A, Framework de 
Referência do Risco e Segurança da Informação,” and specifically with “Appendix D – SPMS 
Arquitetura de Referência da Informação on the dimension 09. Gestão de Comunicações”. 
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5.2 Future Work 
As logical next step for this topic, the proof of concept that “Augmenting the Information 
Security tool suite with Deception technology, empower the organizations to fight better Cyber-
Crime,” is mandatory to fully understand and prove the value of Deception technology as the 
last Information Security defense line. 
 
In future work we aim to progress, starting from the results achieved by this work, to a more 
realistic situation by executing a: 
 
5.2.1 Proof of concept 
The lack of real world results under a controlled attack situation, not present on this 
dissertation, is key to understand the true value of the technology. A hackathon is one of the 
approaches here a group of white hat hackers will infiltrate a test network being the Blue/Red 
Teams in charge of defense and counterattack roles. 
 
 The lead time between the concretization of the intrusion and the detection is one of the 
indicators, other, will be the quality of the information provided by the technology like the method 
of intrusion, type of threat used, attack origin, and so forth.  
 
 
48 
 
6. Bibliography 
Arce, I., Daswani, N., Delgrosso, J., Dhillon, D., Kern, C., Kohno, T., … West, J. (2014). Avoiding the Top 10 
Software Security Design Flaws. IEEE Computer Societys Center for Secure Design. 
Barrett, E. T. (2013). Warfare in a New Domain: the Ethics of Military Cyber-Operations. Journal of Military 
Ethics, 12(1), 4–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.782633. 
Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D.K., & Mead, M. (1987). The Case Strategy in Studies of Information Systems. MIS 
Quarterly, 11, 3, 369-386. 
Bratus, S. (2007). Hacker curriculum: How hackers learn networking. IEEE Distributed Systems Online, 8(10), 1–
7. https://doi.org/10.1109/MDSO.2007.4384582 
Cisco. (2016). Protecting Your Digital Business : The Case for Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention, 1–6. 
Cooke, J. (2010). Center for Strategic and International Studies (Csis ) Welcome :, (March). 
Dinicu, A. (2014). Cyber Threats To National Security. Specific Features, 2(2), 109–114. 
ECPI University. (n.d.). What’s the Difference Between Network Security &amp; Cyber Security? Retrieved June 
13, 2017, from https://www.ecpi.edu/blog/whats-difference-between-network-security-cyber-security. 
Fowler, C. A., & Nesbit, R. F. (1995). Tactical deception in air-land warfare. Journal of Electronic Defense, 18(6). 
(June), pp. 37-44 & 76-79. 
Gervais, M. (2012). Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War *. Berkley Journal of 
International Law, 30(2). https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38R66C. 
Haeni, R. E. (1997). Information Warfare: An Introduction. An Introduction, (January), 1–16. Retrieved from 
papers3://publication/uuid/3286C29C-2FD1-45E6-9EB1-42B86721EA3A. 
Health, T., & Portability, I. (n.d.). About HIPAA.com. 
Hevner, Alan R, Salvatore T March, Jinsoo Park, and Sudha Ram. 2004. “Design Science in Information Systems 
Research.” MIS Quarterly 28(1): 75–105. http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bibtex/journals/misq/HevnerMPR04. 
Ho, C. Y., Lai, Y. C., Chen, I. W., Wang, F. Y., & Tai, W. H. (2012). Statistical analysis of false positives and 
false negatives from real traffic with intrusion detection/prevention systems. IEEE Communications Magazine, 
50(3), 146–154. https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2012.6163595 
Hutchinson, W. (2006). Information warfare and deception. Informing Science, 9, 213–223. 
Infosec Institute. (n.d.). Information and Asset Classification. Retrieved June 14, 2017, from 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/information-and-asset-classification/. 
Institute, S. (2004). Interested in learning SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room In tu , All r igh. Worm 
Propagation and Countermeasures, 36. 
IEEE,  the institute. (2015). Special Report: Cybersecurity - IEEE - The Institute. Retrieved June 16, 2017, from 
http://theinstitute.ieee.org/static/special-report-cybersecurity 
IEEE Cyber Security. (n.d.-a). Avoiding the Top 10 Software Security Design Flaws – IEEE Cybersecurity. 
Retrieved June 16, 2017, from https://cybersecurity.ieee.org/blog/2015/11/13/avoiding-the-top-10-security-
flaws/ 
IEEE Cyber Security. (n.d.-b). Try-CybSI. Retrieved June 16, 2017, from http://try.cybersecurity.ieee.org/trycybsi/ 
ISACA. (n.d.). COBIT 5: A Business Framework for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT. Retrieved 
June 12, 2017, from http://www.isaca.org/cobit/pages/default.aspx. 
ISO. (n.d.). ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security 
management systems -- Requirements. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from 
https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html. 
ITIL.org. (n.d.). ITIL - IT SERVICE MANAGEMENT BOOKSHOP - What is ITIL? Retrieved June 13, 2017, 
from https://www.itil.org.uk/. 
Kopp, C. (2001). Classical Deception Techniques and Perception Management vs. the Four Strategies of 
Information Warfare. World. 
Kostadinov, D. (n.d.). Information and Asset Classification. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/information-and-asset-classification/. 
Koumoutsos, G., & Thramboulidis, K. (2009). A knowledge-based framework for complex, proactive and service-
oriented e-negotiation systems. Electronic Commerce Research, 9(4), 317–349. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-009-9040-6. 
Kuechler, Bill, and Vijay Vaishnavi. 2011. “Promoting Relevance in IS Research: An Informing System for Design 
Science Research.” Informing Science - the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline 14: 125–38. 
http://www.inform.nu/Articles/Vol14/ISJv14p125-138Kuechler570.pdf. 
Kuehl, D. T. (n.d.). Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Computer Network Attack, 76. 
McFarland, K.P., & Stansell, J.C. (1993). Historical perspectives. In L. Patterson, C.M. Santa, C.G. Short, & K. 
Smith (Eds.), Teachers are researchers: Reflection and action. Newark, DE: International Reading Association. 
Mirkovic, J., Reiher, P., Papadopoulos, C., Hussain, A., Shepard, M., Berg, M., & Jung, R. (2008). Testing a 
collaborative DDoS defense in a red team/blue team exercise. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 57(8), 1098–
 
 
49 
 
1112. https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2008.42. 
Missouri State University. (2017). Password Complexity Requirements - Missouri State University. Retrieved June 
13, 2017, from https://cams.missouristate.edu/selfservice/complexity.aspx. 
Nabukenya, J. (2012). Combining Case Study, Design Science and Action Research Methods for Effective 
.Collaboration Engineering Research Efforts. 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
343–352. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2012.162. 
Noffke, S.E., & Stevenson, R.B. (Eds.). (1995). Educational action research: Becoming practically critical. New 
York: Teachers College Press. 
Okenyi, P. O., & Owens, T. J. (2007). On the Anatomy of Human Hacking. Information Systems Security, 16(6), 
302–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/10658980701747237.. 
Pettey, C., & van der Meulen, R. (n.d.). Gartner Identifies the Top 10 Technologies for Information Security in 
2016. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3347717. 
Reswick, J. B. (1994). What constitutes valid research? Qualitative vs. quantitative research: EBSCOhost. Journal 
of Rehabilitation Research & Development, Vol. 31(Issue 2), Vii. https://doi.org/0748-7711. 
Rowe, N. C. (2007). Deception in Defense of Computer Systems from Cyber Attack. Cyber Warfare and Cyber 
Terrorism, 97–104. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59140-991-5. 
Rowe, N. C., & Postgraduate, U. S. N. (2008). THE ETHICS OF DECEPTION IN CYBERSPACE Neil C. Rowe 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. 
Rowe, N. C. (2003). Counterplanning deceptions to foil cyber-attack plans. IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics 
Society Information Assurance Workshop, (June), 221–228. https://doi.org/10.1109/SMCSIA.2003.1232425 
Sabău-Popa, D., Bradea, I., Boloș, M., & Delcea, C. (2015). The Information Confidentiality and Cyber Security in 
Medical Institutions. Annals of the University of Oradea, Economic Science Series, 24, 95–96. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.albany.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=10319
0369&site=eds-live&scope=site. 
Shim, J., & Arkin, R. C. (2013). A taxonomy of robot deception and its benefits in HRI. Proceedings - 2013 IEEE 
International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2013, 2328–2335. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC.2013.398 
Vidgen, Richard, Brian Donnellan, Sabine Matook, and Kieran Conboy. 2012. “Practical Aspects of Design 
Science.” Communications in Computer and Information Science 286(March): 171–77. 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84867457873&partnerID=tZOtx3y1. 
Watts, H. (1985). When teachers are researchers, teaching improves. Journal of Staff Development, 6 (2), 118-127. 
 
 
  
 
 
50 
 
7. Appendix 
7.1 Appendix A – SPMS Framework de Referência do Risco e Segurança 
da Informação 
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7.2 Appendix B – SPMS Programa de Melhoria Contínua do Risco e 
Segurança da Informação 
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7.3 Appendix C – SPMS Framework da Documentação no Âmbito de 
Segurança da Informação 
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7.4 Appendix D – SPMS Arquitetura de Referência da Informação 
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7.5 Appendix E – Information Security Technologies Comparison Table  
 
Phishing and 
Email Spamming Botnet
Malware and 
Spyware Keyloggers
Social 
Engineering
Denial of 
Service Virus Worm
Advanced Persistent 
Threat (ATP)
Type of threat through the internet, 
or flooding of the Internet or any 
unwanted online correspondences
Guard of 
compromised 
Systems, 
sometimes called 
“zombies,” that are 
under the command 
and control of a 
solitary 
“Botmaster.”
Malicious program 
designed to gather 
computer 
information without 
the awareness of the 
client.
Programs that can 
screen and record 
the client keyboard 
information while 
typing in Computer 
System for later 
access.
Kind of 
technique in 
which it traps 
or tricks the 
client to reveal 
valuable 
information.
Attack that 
upsets the 
normal 
function of the 
computer 
system and 
thus prevents 
access to 
authorized 
users
Program that spreads 
itself from one 
computer to another 
computer without the 
users’ authorization 
to do so
Computer Program 
that moves from one 
machine 
environment, then 
onto the next 
machine 
environment often 
keeping a record of 
the last environment
Continuous computer 
hacking that is actively 
supported by several 
people that usually 
targets one specific 
entity.
Access Security Brokers 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Software as a Service (SaaS) apps, increasingly pervasive in enterprises, 
provide new challenges to security teams with their limited visibility and 
control options. Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB) allow chief 
information security officers (CISOs) an opportunity to apply enterprise 
security policies across multiple cloud services.
Endpoint Detection and Response 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 0 18
Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions allow CISOs to detect 
potential security breaches and react quickly. These tools record endpoint and 
network events, and the data are continuously searched using known 
indicators of compromise (IOC) and machine-learning techniques for early 
identification of breaches.
No signature Approaches to Endpoint Prevention 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 9
Techniques such as memory protection and exploit prevention and machine 
learning-based systems, which uses mathematical models, augment ineffective 
signature-based approaches for malware prevention against advanced and 
targeted attacks.
User and Entity Behavioral Analytics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
User and entity behavioral analytics provide user-centric analytics alongside 
information about networks, endpoints, and applications.
Microsegmentation and Flow Visibility 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 15
Microsegmentation, a more granular segmentation, stops attackers already in 
the system from moving laterally (“east/west”) to other systems. Visualization 
tools allow security teams to understand flow patterns, set segmentation 
policies and monitor for deviations. For data in motion, some vendors 
provide optional encryption of the network traffic.
Security Testing for DevOps 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8
As DevOps integrates security into the workflow (DevSecOps) emerging 
operating models offer an automated, transparent and compliant configuration 
of underlying security infrastructure based on policy reflecting the currently 
deployed state of the workloads.
Intelligence-Driven Security Operations Center Orchestration 
Solutions 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8
Intelligence-driven security operations centers (ISOCs) are designed to deal 
with the new “detection and response” paradigm. This solution requires the 
evolution of traditional security operation center (SOCs) to offer an adaptive 
architecture and context-aware components.
Remote Browser 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 1 0 10
CISOs can address malicious malware delivered via email, URLs or websites 
by isolating the browsing function from the endpoint and corporate network. 
The attack is done by remotely presenting the browser session from an on-site 
or cloud-based “browser server.” The server sessions are reset to a known 
good state, and this technique reduces the surface area for an attack, shifting 
the risk to server sessions.
Deception 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 25
Deception tools, as the name implies, use deceit or tricks to thwart attacks. 
The security team creates fake vulnerabilities, systems, shares, and cookies to 
tempt attackers. Any real attack on these resources indicates to security teams 
an attack is occurring, as legitimate users will not see or need access to the 
fake systems.
Pervasive Trust Services 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 0 18
Security models must evolve alongside the projected pervasiveness of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) and increasing dependency on operational 
technology. Trust services can manage the needs of billions of devices with 
limited processing capability. More importantly, trust services are designed to 
scale and can offer secure provisioning, data integrity, confidentiality, devices 
identity and authentication.
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